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THE SAME OLD MODERNISATION GAME? 
RUSSIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERNISATION 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 337/SEPTEMBER 2010 
FÉLIX KRAWATZEK AND RODERICK KEFFERPÜTZ
*  
hroughout history Russia has tended to undergo transformations in spurts, with the aim 
of reaching a similar level of development as its European counterparts.
1 Peter the Great 
carried out a significant modernisation policy in the 17
th century, thereby transforming 
Russia into a European empire, Alexander II undertook radical reforms in the 19
th century, 
including an attempt at creating a parliamentary body, while Joseph Stalin embarked on a 
ruthless industrialisation drive in the 1930s, which at great cost turned the Soviet Union into a 
major industrial powerhouse, and Gorbachev attempted to re-invigorate the Soviet Union 
through perestroika and glasnost; ultimately contributing to its dissolution.  
Time and again, Russia has had to contend with these different attempts at modernisation. They 
have led to great transformations as well as major debates on Russia’s future trajectory, pitting, 
for example, Westernisers (zapadniki) against Slavophiles (slavianofily). The former 
propagating a Western course of modernisation, guided by the ‘Philosophical Letters’ of Petr 
Chaadaev (1794-1856), the latter insisting on Russia’s unique culture and character and the 
development of its own path of economic development.
2 
With the ascent of Dmitry Medvedev to the presidency of Russia in 2008, the concept of 
‘modernisation’ has yet again gained traction. In 2009, modernisation became more or less the 
official leitmotif of Medvedev’s presidency, advanced by his article “Go Russia!” and State of 
the Nation speech.
3 Following the haphazard Yeltsin era and Putin’s years of re-centralisation 
and stability, modernisation has again unleashed a broader internal and international debate 
about Russia’s future trajectory. 
The European Union has been following these developments in Russia and is keen to see 
Moscow embark on a broad modernisation agenda, realising the potential this has for forging an 
invigorated and constructive EU-Russia partnership. In this context, the latest EU-Russia 
                                                      
* Félix Krawatzek is Visiting Researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and MPhil 
candidate at Oxford University. 
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1 See, amongst others, Gerschenkron, A. (1962), Economic backwardness in historical perspective, a 
book of essays, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Dixon, S., (1999), The Modernisation of 
Russia, 1676-1825, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press or Kangaspuro, M. and Smith, J. (2006), 
Modernisation in Russia since 1900, Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society. For the debate among 
historians on the notion of backwardness see for example, Hildemeier, M. (1987), “ Das Privileg der 
Rückständigkeit: Anmerkungen zum Wandel einer Interpretationsfigur der neueren russischen 
Geschichte”, Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 244, pp. 557-603. 
2 For a recent publication on that debate, see: de Meaux, L. (2010), La Russie et la tentation de l’Orient, 
Paris: Fayard. 
3 Medvedev, D., Go Russia!, 10 September 2009: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2009/09/10/ 
1534_type104017_221527.shtml and Medvedev, D., Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the 
Russian Federation, 12 November 2009: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/11/12/ 
1321_type70029type82912_222702.shtml. 
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summit in Rostov-on-Don resulted in a “Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernisation” 
(known as P4M). Indeed, hopes are high for this new partnership. Particularly in view of the 
inability to conclude an agreement to replace the outdated Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) and the dismal track record of the so-called “Four Common Spaces” where, 
according to progress reports, the main achievements were the fact that “negotiations 
continued”.
4  
The newly established Partnership for Modernisation, it is hoped, will bring renewed vigour and 
serve as a benchmark to evaluate progress in the relations between the two countries. The 
agenda is ambitious and broad in scope, encompassing economic, social, environmental and 
legal dimensions, which in itself will be a challenge.
5 
However, one particular obstacle that could seriously impede the partnership’s success and has 
so far only gained limited attention is the diverging views on modernisation itself. Akin to the 
conflict between the zapadniki and slavianofily, this paper argues that diverging concepts and 
understandings of modernisation between the European Union and Russian Federation have the 
potential to seriously undermine this new initiative. While at first glance this predicament might 
sound abstract in nature, it can in actual fact translate into real difficulties on the ground. 
Different perspectives on modernisation go hand in hand with different understandings of how 
modernisation should be brought forward and the functions, level of engagement as well as 
capabilities of civil society, the state, political actors, the press or the economy within that 
concept of modernisation. 
Even within Russia a number of competing visions abound on how to modernise the country, 
and the EU itself cannot be sure about the representativeness of each of those. While some 
Russian actors ascribe to the state the main role of driving modernisation via direct state action 
or through state-run enterprises, others place a greater emphasis on setting up an attractive legal 
and competitive economic framework that encourages private enterprises to innovate and 
modernise the country; a kind of top-bottom versus bottom-up approach. And again while some 
advocate a holistic modernisation of Russian society stretching from the economy to the 
political system and social structures, others prefer modernisation to be about gaining access to 
the latest technologies and developing new powerful industries. On the other hand, many do not 
seem to understand what the term ‘modernisation’ is supposed to mean. At the Krasnoyarsk 
Economic Forum on 11 February 2010 in Tomsk, for example, 70% of the participants 
attending said that they did not understand what the authorities meant by modernisation.
6 
As such, there are in Russia a variety of concepts espoused by different actors with regards to 
modernisation, and with that some confusion. In order to increase the chances of success of the 
EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation, a common understanding on who drives 
modernisation and how they go about it will be indispensable. In this context, this paper aims to 
illustrate the polyphony within Russia concerning the concept of modernisation by 
deconstructing the various Russian understandings of the concept. By illustrating these 
diverging views within Russia and highlighting the potential differences in understanding 
                                                      
4 The four common spaces consist of (1) the common economic space, (2) freedom, security and justice, 
(3) external security, (4) research and education. For main achievements see the EU External Action 
Service 2009 Progress Report, March 2010: http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/commonspaces_prog_ 
report_2009_en.pdf. 
5 Council of the European Union: Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernisation, EU-Russia 
Summit, Rostov-on-Don, 1 June 2010: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/ 
en/er/114747.pdf where the priority areas of the P4M are outlined. 
6 Wood, A., “Ten Russian Propositions”, Chatham House, 22 February 2010: 
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between Brussels and Moscow that are the result of it, we aim to draw attention to the issue and 
emphasise the fact that the difference in defining modernisation should not be underestimated as 
a hurdle to a successful EU-Russia Modernisation Strategy. 
A new urgency to modernise 
Following the financial and economic crisis, the ‘modernisation’ of Russia has in fact imposed 
itself on the country. Russians today largely agree on the fact that the situation in the country is 
problematic.
7 Russia’s demographics are particularly worrisome, with an extremely low average 
life expectancy (62.77 years for men; 74.67 years for women)
8 and a generally declining 
population rate, although in 2009 Russia saw its first annual population increase in 15 years.
9 
Whilst the crisis hit Russia severely, it also exposed a series of structural problems within the 
country. Among these problems, the dependency of the economy on the evolution of the oil 
price figures most prominently. Add to this low labour productivity, the opaque nature of 
Russian bureaucracy, low energy efficiency and the bubble that was created in the construction 
sector.
10 All these problems were present in Russia independent of developments in the global 
economy. 
However, due to the rapid deterioration of the social and economic situation across Russia, with 
the economy shrinking by around 8% last year, the economic model that was consensual under 
Putin has come increasingly under pressure. This is a predicament for Russia’s politicians, who 
are feeling the heat from below. Whilst economic performance on its own does not explain the 
popularity of the president or the government, it is a particularly important factor in Russia.
11 
As such, the great recession was the main trigger for a comprehensive re-evaluation of Russia’s 
economic and, to some degree, state structures. This was facilitated by a more stable foreign 
policy situation. With the NATO accession dead in the water following the war with Georgia, 
and Ukraine shifting back into Russia’s ‘sphere of privileged interest’ under Yanukovich, 
Russia’s particular sensitivities regarding these issues had been temporarily assuaged. A general 
rapprochement with the West, be it through the START agreement with the US, the thaw in its 
relationship with Poland following the presidential plane crash, and the resolution of the long-
standing border dispute with Norway also contributed to a more secure external dimension. This 
allowed for greater resources and attention at home, facilitating an emerging discourse on 
Russia’s modernisation. On the other hand, this rapprochement is also a result of Russia’s 
recognition that it needs modernisation and a secure foreign field, particularly with regards to 
the West, which would be a main player in aiding Russian modernisation efforts through foreign 
direct investments (FDI) and technology transfers. In this context, President Medvedev has aptly 
noted that: 
                                                      
7 See the publication of the Russian Academy of Science Gotowo li rossijskoe obschtschestwo k 
modernisazii (Is Russian Society ready for modernisation?), Moscow 2010, available at 
http://www.isras.ru/files/File/Doclad/gotovo_li_rossijskoe_obshestvo_k_modernizacii.pdf. 
8 Russian life expectancy figures from Rosstat: 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/demo26.xls. 
9 “Russia sees first population increase in 15 years”, BBC News, 19 January 2010. 
10 Aslund, A., Guriev, S. and Kuchins, A. (eds) (2010), Russia after the global economic crisis, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. 
11 Although of course it plays a key role in most countries, after all it was Clinton who coined the term 
“It’s the economy, stupid!”.  See also: Treisman, D. (2010), “Russian Politics in a Time of Turmoil”, in 
A. Aslund, S. Guriev, and A. Kuchins (eds), Russia after the global economic crisis, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, Washington, D.C., pp. 39-58. 4 | KRAWATZEK & KEFFERPÜTZ 
 
harmonising our relations with Western democracies is not a question of taste, personal 
preferences or the prerogatives of given political groups. Our current domestic 
financial and technological capabilities are not sufficient for a qualitative improvement 
in the quality of life. We need money and technology from Europe, America and Asia.  
Whilst there is a tendency to rightly attribute the term ‘modernisation’ to Medvedev’s 
presidency, it is important to note that the term already made its (re)appearance in Russian 
political discourse way back in February 2008. One of the last important speeches from Putin as 
president had at its core Russia’s Development Strategy to 2020 and the idea of modernisation 
already figured prominently at this time.
12 Besides listing numerous achievements of recent 
years, the speech also identified several goals, such as achieving a life expectancy of 75 years 
by 2020 and having the middle class represent 60% if not 70% of the social strata by the same 
year. Putin also illustrated many of the problems facing Russia: 
We are only making fragmentary attempts at modernising the economy. And this inevitably 
leads to an increase in Russia's dependence on imports of goods and technology to reinforce 
for us the role of a raw material appendage of the world economy. 
More specifically, Putin highlighted the fact that “today’s apparatus is a largely bureaucratic, 
corrupt system” and that one of the main problems is “the excessive centralisation”. Quite 
ironic, given the fact that Putin’s years were marked by a re-centralisation and reinforcement of 
the power vertical. And even more so given that Putin also considers the Russian government to 
be the main driver of modernisation. Nevertheless, the speech brings to light a certain degree of 
continuity in the presidential handover in 2008, even though Medvedev has made the main 
messages his own. 
The duumvirate’s modernisation talk 
Ever since the publication of the “modernisation manifesto” (Go Russia and State of the Nation 
2009), modernisation has turned into the leitmotif of the current presidency. President 
Medvedev recognises the need for a general restructuring of Russian society in order to ensure 
future economic prosperity in a globalised world. Within this endeavour, Medvedev has 
emphasised all dimensions, leaving no sphere untouched. First and foremost, he emphasises the 
need for a technological and economic modernisation focusing particularly on five strategic 
vectors, which include energy efficiency, nuclear technology, ICT, space infrastructure and 
satellites, and the production of medical equipment.
13 Simultaneously, he addresses Russia’s 
“legal nihilism” and the need for an independent, fair and impartial judicial system.
14 The 
political sphere also figures prominently in his discourse on modernisation; numerous 
references to the development of a parliamentary system with free and fair competition leading 
to periodical changes within the political elite can be found.  
Medvedev also acknowledges the significance of a developed public sphere (Öffentlichkeit) for 
the emergence of a “modern society”
15 (according to him “one that seeks constant renewal, 
                                                      
12 Putin, V., 8 February 2008, Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia’s Development 
Strategy through to 2020: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/02/08/1137_type82912type 
82913_159643.shtml. 
13 Medvedev, D., Go Russia!, 10 September 2009: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2009/09/ 
10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml. 
14 Legal nihilism (the non-respect of the rule of law) was addressed, for example, right after taking the 
oath of office, see: Stott, M. and Shchedrov, O., “Russia’s Medvedev takes power and pledges freedom”, 
Reuters, 7 May 2008. 
15 He explicitly states in his presidential address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation that 
“it is clear that we cannot carry out our strategic plans without real change in society. Only if we THE SAME OLD MODERNISATION GAME?  RUSSIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERNISATION | 5 
 
continuous evolutionary transformation of social practices, democratic institutions, visions of 
the future, assessments of the present, the one engaged in gradual but irreversible changes in 
technological, economic and cultural spheres, the steady improvement of the quality of life.”
 16) 
and underlines the importance of Russian civil society and its evolution within a reforming 
political system.  
As such, within the clash inside the Russian elite between those who foresee a strong state and 
authoritarian government as the only way to modernise and those who consider political reform 
a precondition for modernisation, President Medvedev is generally regarded as belonging to the 
latter camp.
17 Besides listing the need for political reform on numerous occasions he also states 
that modernisation will be achieved by unleashing the “creative potential of every individual. 
Not through intimidation, but through interest.”
18 However, while Medvedev often denounces a 
modernisation driven by a strong authoritarian state and instead notes the importance of political 
liberalisation as a conditio sine qua non to modernisation, this does not mean he completely 
negates the role of the state per se. At times, some statist attitudes tend to emerge. For example, 
while Western governments tend to attract scientists and engineers by increasing their own 
desirability, Medvedev states that Russia will simply “hire the best scientists and engineers from 
around the world”
 19 as if they could be ordered like take-away pizza. Likewise, with regards to 
the state corporations, he notes that they have no future in the modern world, stating that they 
should be transformed into “joint stock companies under government control”. As such, a 
certain element of state/government control still seems desirable although he later states that 
they should in future be sold to private investors.
20 
Prime Minister Putin in particular trusts in the ability of the state to drive modernisation 
forward. Contrary to President Medvedev, however, Putin limits his view of modernisation to a 
technological-economic level rather than extending it to the political and public sphere. In 
general, since the 2008 speech on Russia’s Development Strategy, Putin has spoken little on 
modernisation and on the rare occasion that he has it is generally rather vague; not going beyond 
techno-economic aspects such as the need to “scrap customs fees on technological equipment 
for sectors that [are] pivotal for the development of the national economy”
21 or increase custom 
duties on natural commodities. 
As such, while Medvedev tends to take a holistic view of modernisation and in writing declares 
the need for political reform, which is often taken to mean that he believes a strong state should 
                                                                                                                                                            
strengthen our political system and legal institutions, our country’s internal and external security, 
consolidate our social stability and develop modern education and culture, the culture in the broadest 
sense of the word, will we be able to achieve success.” 
16 Medvedev, D., Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 12 November 
2009: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/11/12/1321_type70029type82912_222702.shtml. 
17 For example, at the recent Valdai Club discussion he noted that “only a free person is capable of 
modernising. Not someone who is afraid of the state, afraid for his life or his business”. See: Clover, 
Charles ‘Medvedev on reform path’, Financial Times, 11 September 2010. 
18 Medvedev, D., Go Russia!, 10 September 2009: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2009/09 
/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml. 
19 Medvedev, D., Go Russia!, 10 September 2009: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2009/09 
/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml. 
20 Medvedev, D., Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 12 November 
2009. 
21 “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin meets with participants of the 7th meeting of the Valdai International 
Discussion Club in Sochi”, 6 September 2010: http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/12039/. 6 | KRAWATZEK & KEFFERPÜTZ 
 
not be needed in modernisation, he, like Putin, does seem to believe in the transformative power 
of the government and the state in general. 
The rugged path towards modernisation 
Some of the projects launched under Putin and Medvedev in the name of modernisation are also 
state-run initiatives rather than actions that set a certain framework and enable the private sector 
to innovate.
22 This holds true particularly for research and development. Besides establishing 
massive conglomerates to spearhead industrial development and new technologies in 2007, such 
as Rosnano, a state corporation investing in innovation and promising nano-technologies, and 
Rostekhnologii, a defence industry state cooperation, one particular flagship initiative by 
Medvedev is the attempt to construct a Russian ‘Silicon Valley’ outside Moscow at Skolkovo. 
This innovation city or innograd is designed to develop new research and technologies 
catapulting Russia into a knowledge society, regardless of the fact that Silicon Valley was 
created due to favourable conditions and not because of a US government construction 
programme. Furthermore, Russia already has over 100 science centres and technoparks, which 
are so far only delivering extremely modest results. Not to mention the fact that other science 
centres have withered away, such as Novosibirsk Academic City.
23 In addition, many consider 
this new innovation city as just another corrupt cash cow for certain segments of the elite. 
Research and development spending and institutions in general are highly state-run. While 
private industry accounts for between 55-75% of R&D spending in the EU, Japan and USA, in 
Russia it accounts for less than 30%. And although the Russian Duma has offered tax 
allowances to innovative companies, most do not take up these beneficial exemptions due to 
Russia’s legal nihilism and the fear that at any point arbitrary tax enforcement might run their 
businesses into the ground. As such, it comes as no surprise that Russia scores particularly 
poorly in the World Bank’s Economic Incentive Regime, which looks at the general business 
environment, regulations, rule of law, tariff and non-tariff barriers.
24 Russia’s march towards a 
knowledge-based economy is rather unlikely given the lack of funds,
25 an overall failure to 
mobilise R&D in private enterprises and shape an attractive economic framework. 
The same state interference can be seen in civil society. In this context, Medvedev states, 
perhaps in a somewhat paternalistic manner, that the “development of civil society is only 
possible in a developed political system.”
26 Such an approach can already be observed on the 
ground in Russian actions to strengthen civil society, which are rather ambiguous. A blurred 
distinction between the private and the public is to be observed and leads to hybrid forms. 
Public participation in Russia has been institutionalised in two ways. First through the creation 
of the Public Chamber, whose members are appointed, accused of corruption and of not being 
representative. Second through “the Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights Council under 
the President of the Russian Federation” also known as the “Pamfilova’s Council”, created in 
2004. The latter institute does not have much systemic influence, but seems to be efficient on 
individual cases, however. 
                                                      
22 Although a new law on energy efficiency in November 2009 has facilitated investments in this sector. 
23 Yasin, Y., “Fierce Cannibal Invites Little Girls To Cooperate”, Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, 17 February 
2010. 
24 Liuhto, K. “Rosnano and Skolkovo are Russia’s best innovation promoting measures, but they are not 
enough to modernise Russia as a whole”, Baltic Rim Economies Review, Vol. 3, 23 June 2010. 
25 Largely due to the fact that the Russian government only invests about 1% of GDP into R&D. 
26 Medvedev, D., Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 12 November 
2009: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/11/12/1321_type70029type82912_222702.shtml. THE SAME OLD MODERNISATION GAME?  RUSSIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERNISATION | 7 
 
No matter what one thinks of these two institutions, the participation of civil society in the 
political game is by nature difficult if it is institutionalised from above, as it militates against the 
idea of an autonomous civic sphere. When the state seeks to prepare, orchestrate, even control 
civic participation in the political game, it is the state itself that is the only player in the game. 
Consequently, when it comes to the cooperation with the European Union it is this confidence in 
the ability of the state propagated through the official Russian political sphere that hinders the 
goals set out in the P4M. Within the EU, in general it is not so much the state that expects to 
have the ability to solve all problems. Rather it is the government that is expected to set an 
overall framework within which market forces and society can lead transformation. As a 
consequence there is a (currently barely mentioned) disagreement on who the partners are in this 
modernisation partnership. While the European Union would be keen to engage civil society 
actors in a modernisation drive, the Russian side would overwhelmingly focus on the state and 
might see the EU’s emphasis on Russian civil society as a veiled attempt at democratisation and 
building pressure on the elite from below, which certainly would not go down well. 
The many views on modernisation 
There are many actors with their own views on modernisation within Moscow beyond the 
‘official’ (read: the duumvirate’s) political understanding of modernisation, and here there are 
also variations between Putin and Medvedev. Looking at a number of official and unofficial 
advisors is particularly interesting to the extent that they benefit from a degree of independence 
that allows them to voice what official politicians are more often than not able to do. 
Igor Yurgens from the Institute for Contemporary Development stands for a vision of 
modernisation that is particularly favoured in the West with its overwhelming focus on social 
innovation and mobilising private individuals through a comprehensive political and economic 
liberalisation. Yurgens used to be one of the key political consultants to Medvedev, spelling out 
clearly what Medvedev could not due to political constraints. However, Yurgens’ position 
within the Russian system is currently difficult to evaluate following his apparent demotion to 
the status of pure academic. Hence it is a subject of some speculation whether Yurgens’ position 
is representative of what Medvedev would like to say or rather an expression of his personal 
view. However, it is to be noted that Yurgens was given a central role (moderator of one of the 
panels) within the Global Policy Forum in Yaroslav 2010 – the political elite at least is not 
openly opposed to his views. 
According to Yurgens the modernisation of Russia needs to be deep, systemic and decisive. If it 
is to succeed a fundamental change of the economic structure is needed, in particular a move 
away from resource dependency. But even more so all aspects of Russian society need to be 
affected. If it were only to concentrate on technological and economic aspects it is doomed to 
failure right from the start. “Modernisation begins with the right mentality. The human 
component takes on a special importance: values and principles, morals and motivations, 
orientations and systems of rules”.
27 Yurgens does not stop to underline the importance of 
fighting corruption in the country, which is according to him only possible within a political 
system based on real competition, an independent and free media and a developed civil society 
                                                      
27 Yurgens, I. (2010), Russia in the 21st century: Vision for the Future, Moscow: Institute of 
Contemporary Development, January 2010, available online at http://www.riocenter.ru/files/INSOR% 
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as powerful referee.
28 These non-economic aspects are of the same importance as the five 
industrial priorities Medvedev identified in the modernisation manifesto. 
Arkady Dvorkovich is officially the Chief Economic Advisor to the current Russian President. 
In an article published in February 2010, Dvorkovich presents his vision of modernisation, 
which reiterates Medvedev’s priority industries as well as the importance of technological 
transfer to Russia and attracting new investments to Russia. Whilst there are allusions to the 
importance of a meaningful cooperation between the state, business and society, it remains 
unclear who will implement modernisation or how this should be done in concrete terms.
29 
Dvorkovich also speaks of the necessity to restructure the corporate and public sectors, but 
however remains silent as to what place actors from society or the economy are to take in that 
‘modern’ Russia. 
Whereas Dvorkovich has understood the necessity for Russia to reform the foundations of its 
economic system, Vladislav Surkov, chief consultant to Putin who is sometimes considered as 
the main ideologist of the Kremlin, does have a different vision of the current state of affairs. He 
has defended the existing political system, in particular the single party dominance, and he is 
often considered as the architect of the current party system. His comment towards the 
beginning of the financial crisis nowadays seems absurd. In March 2009, for example, he stated: 
“I would like to say once again that the system works, that it will cope with the crisis and get 
through it.... Everything is OK”.
30 Surkov’s views are diametrically opposed to Yurgens’ 
proposals and differ significantly from those of Dvorkovich. In his statements, Surkov probably 
takes one of the most hard-line positions with regards to the Russian state claiming that 
“consolidated state power is the only instrument of modernisation in Russia. And, let me assure 
you, it is the only one possible.”
31 The friction between the latter three actors also tends to 
demonstrate possible divisions between the Medvedev and Putin camps with regard to Russia’s 
modernisation. 
A number of contributions have been made by the academic milieu to the debate on 
modernisation. The 2004 presidential candidate Sergey Glazyev, who lost the elections against 
Putin and has officially retired
32 from politics to become a somewhat influential academic seems 
to have similar views to Surkov. He also upholds a key role for the state and not the market or 
(civil) society, writing that finally “for the first time in post-Soviet history, the state is in charge 
of the economy (and modernisation) and not international financial institutions, exporters, 
multinationals, monopolies or organised crime.”
33 
Andrey Yakovlev, Professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, on the other hand, 
stresses the danger of an ‘unsocial’ modernisation. According to a study conducted by the 
                                                      
28 Yurgens, I., President Medvedev's Address Was a “Message to the Thinking”, 13 November 2009: 
http://www.riocenter.ru/en/_news/analytics/7483. 
29 Dvorkovich, A., “Modernizing Russia Through Innovation”, The Huffington Post, 8 February 2010: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arkady-dvorkovich/modernizing-russia-throug_b_454156.html. 
30 Surkov, V., Speech To Strategy 2020 Forum, 11 March 2009: 
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Higher School of Economics in Moscow, an increase in productivity thanks to an improvement 
of industrial processes runs the risk of being accompanied by an increase in unemployment in 
traditional sectors. This collateral damage of modernisation has been recognised by political 
leaders, who consequently block the modernisation agenda on certain crucial points, despite all 
the rhetoric. According to Yakovlev, the only way out of this vicious circle is a boost to the 
investment climate in order to attract new businesses and create new jobs.
34 In order to achieve 
this objective the (organised) participation in the political elaboration process of representatives 
of the economic sphere is of importance. The request for greater participation in an organised 
and democratic manner goes hand in hand with a desired shift towards political decentralisation. 
A vision of modernisation that has for the time only had limited impact on the political agenda. 
When it comes to the relation between state and business, a study conducted by Yakovlev 
concluded that a change in the pattern of allocating public money to private enterprises is to be 
observed. Based on a survey of some 1,000 industrial firms, it was noted that since 2007-08 
priorities from the federal on the one hand and regional/municipal levels on the other have 
diverged. Whereas the federal level has oriented its allocation policy largely towards the 
preservation of jobs in ‘old’ industries with a high labour intensity, the decentralised level’s 
support was directed more towards encouraging ‘modernisation’ with ‘the investment activity of 
firms and presence of foreign investors [being] among the criteria for its allocation’.
35 
Gleb Pavlovsky,  an influential intellectual and advisor to the Russian presidential 
administration, Head of the “Effective Politics Foundation” and well-known political 
technologist understands Medvedev’s modernisation approach as a holistic one: 
He [Medvedev] combines the task of modernisation with the task of democracy-
building, but he does not substitute one with another. No political institutions will 
substitute the economic solvency.
36 
When Medvedev presented the modernisation manifesto Pavlovsky quickly admitted “we are a 
backward country”. The view Pavlovsky expresses is likely to stand for a certain segment of the 
Russian elite, being saturated with the Putin years of economic and state centralisation. 
Pavlovsky does not cease to stress the importance of going beyond a simple 
technological/economic form of modernisation if Russia wants to succeed in tackling the 
challenges that it faces. 
When we speak about modernisation, some see it as endless lines of computers and 
walking robots. The question concerns a deep fundamental reform of law-enforcement 
structures and their return to implementing constitutional duties.
37 
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It is important to note that Pavlovsky has an acute sense of where the political wind is blowing, 
having previously advised Putin on how to put civil society into government structures (the 
Public Chamber). 
Beyond all question, this paper proposes a snapshot of the different interpretations of 
modernisation, leaving a number of actors such as political parties or the church aside. 
However, the proposed selection illustrates the current polyphony of views on Russia’s path 
towards modernisation. Taking into account the above, two distinctions can be drawn between 
them. First, those who – according to their statements – see modernisation purely from a 
technological and economic point of view (Putin, Surkov) in opposition to those who take a 
holistic perspective acknowledging the need for political reform in order to stimulate 
modernisation (such as Medvedev, Yurgens or Pavlovsky). Second, those who see the state and 
government as the central driver of Russia’s modernisation (Medvedev, Putin, Glazyev, etc.) 
versus those who want modernisation to be driven by private enterprise and social forces with 
the government setting the necessary conducive framework (Yurgens and the European 
institutions). Obviously, these distinctions are not to be seen in a strict dichotomy but there is a 
lot of leeway between them. President Medvedev, for example, often recognises the importance 
of private entrepreneurs and society driving modernisation while at other points as well as in his 
actions, the state still seems to play the only relevant role. 
Stirring up a hornets’ nest: Obstacles to modernisation 
It is self-evident that these preliminarily outlined divisions in how to go about modernising 
Russia already make an ambitious modernisation agenda difficult to implement. In addition to 
this, however, there are at least four pertinent factors that can effectively inhibit a 
transformation of Russia’s economy and society at large. 
First, the biggest obstacle is the overall resistance to change. Too many players in the higher 
echelons of the economic and political system stand to lose too much from any kind of reform. 
Medvedev’s modernisation discourse is thereby viewed with much suspicion as these players 
fear that it will turn into yet another round of asset distribution. The same rings true for the 
inflated bureaucracy, which sees no personal benefits in modernisation and thereby prefers the 
status quo. As eloquently noted by Lilia Shevtsova from the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace in Moscow, “a state based on merger of power, ownership and suppression 
of competition destroys all reforming impulses. Such a state obstructs modernisation by its very 
nature”. It also explains why the majority of the elite prefer a top-down modernisation since 
they prefer being in the driver’s seat themselves. They particularly remember the Gorbachevian 
experience, in which political reform aimed at invigorating the Soviet Union led to a complete 
restructuring of the power structures and eventual dissolution. These fears on the part of certain 
sections of the elite are not unfounded given the statement by Arkady Dvorkovich that “the 
present elite, which is above all bureaucratic, must be replaced by a new elite which will be 
more open to society.”
38 
Another potential structural obstacle is the symbiotic relationship between politics and the 
economy. With the power structures and the economy interwoven it seems nigh on impossible 
to create economic dynamism without political reform. However, political reform will 
obviously encounter strong resistance from the incumbents, making it difficult to implement. As 
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remarked by Andrei Sharonov from Troika Dialogue: “modernisation contradicts the 
government’s primary interest in stability, which top business is sharing.”
39 
Third, despite the fact that a number of Russian citizens are motivated and dedicated to work on 
problems of general interest (the increasingly strong environmental movements are an 
illustration of this), there is a general impression of powerlessness when it comes to issues 
beyond their own immediate neighbourhood. Russians become publicly active on matters 
revolving around solidarity or the local level – hence the environmental movements or the very 
strong Russian motoring association. Public life, in particular questions of a political dimension, 
are however perceived as being impossible to influence. Given the view that it is impossible to 
shape the state of affairs, there is little motivation to get involved in matters beyond individual 
and palpable interests. When Russians are asked about the possibility to change the state of 
affairs, the high proportion of those who declare that there is no possibility (21% according to a 
Levada poll 2008
40) is illustrative. Hence around 60% of Russian citizens see the state as the 
main driving force behind a successful economic modernisation and a Levada poll in March 
2010 showed that a large majority of Russians think that control of the state is important for the 
development of new technologies.
41 Acknowledging the importance of society for 
modernisation, these results ought to worry the Russian elite. If Russians themselves cannot 
believe in modernisation any effort by the political sphere to bring about change (in particular if 
civil society is to be involved in this, as has been frequently stated by Medvedev) is starting 
from a particularly shaky position.  
Last but not least, it is possible that the modernisation drive might lose steam with a robust 
recovery. With oil prices returning to $70 a barrel, the sense of urgency shared by the different 
elites might subside, leading to a strong preference for business-as-usual. 
All of this will have a knock-on effect on the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation. As the 
EU aims to gain a foothold and become a partner in Russia’s modernisation, numerous 
segments of the elite might also consider the EU understanding of modernisation, which 
includes civil society actors, free press and elections, as yet another veiled attempt to 
democratise and weaken control by the elite. Should such a perception take hold within Russia, 
failure of the P4M seems very likely. 
Conclusion 
Numerous waves of modernisation have swept through Russia since Peter the Great. Their costs 
for the nation have often been tremendously high. The suffering of Russian society in the name 
of Soviet industrialisation and the chaos engendered by glasnost and perestroika are still fresh 
in the mind. The current debate on modernisation should thus be seen in the light of numerous 
experiences throughout history; experiences that are not likely to endow ‘modernisation’ with 
many positive associations. 
This paper had three main aims. First to illustrate the polyphony of views on modernisation in 
Russia. Contrary to general opinion, the Russian ‘public sphere’ is a lot more heterogeneous 
than previously thought and competing visions of modernisation do circulate within the country. 
Second, obstacles to a successful implementation of the ambitious modernisation agenda are 
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multifaceted. Several factors within Russia itself have been identified: the political and 
economic elite, the interconnectedness of state and economy, Russian citizens themselves, and 
the robustness of the economic recovery. Each factor on its own is important enough to 
contribute to the failure of modernisation. 
The third objective was to illustrate the likely implications of the aforementioned for the P4M. 
Whilst a European position vis-à-vis Russia has not always been easy to establish – leading to 
strongly opposed camps of member states – there is nevertheless a consensus amongst the 27 
when it comes to the P4M. The EU and its members clearly favour the Medvedev/Yurgens 
vision of modernisation, with a pivotal role for civil society, respect for the rule of law and 
human rights and the implementation of democratic standards, as well as economic and 
technological modernisation. 
However, the (still unacknowledged) disagreement about who is to bring about modernisation in 
Russia and how this should be achieved is a great risk to the success of the Partnership. The EU 
clearly favours a bottom-up approach
42 whereby Russia creates the necessary environment to 
unleash entrepreneurial creativity and the force of civil society organisations. Russia, on the 
other hand, and even Medvedev, puts a significant degree of trust in the capacity of the state to 
shape the modernisation agenda. 
This dichotomy might make it difficult to put flesh on the bones of the P4M with an Action Plan 
on the new co-operation agreement, which is expected at the next EU-Russia summit this 
autumn. The European Union might be in a particularly tricky situation here. If it pushes too 
hard on the bottom-up approach and human rights it risks alienating its Russian counterparts and 
confirming potential Russian fears that the EU is approaching the P4M with ulterior motives. 
On the other hand, if the EU negates these elements and reduces the P4M to a mere techno-
economic level, it will do little other than strengthen existing elite structures and thereby 
hamper the reform and comprehensive modernisation of the country. This will be a difficult 
balancing act to pull off for the European Union. 
In this context, the EU will have to be acutely aware of the way that the multitude of Russian 
actors are approaching the issue of modernisation and to what extent it is being discussed in the 
country. Furthermore, the EU will have to take into consideration the fact that the 
implementation of a P4M Action Plan might become significantly bogged down in Russia’s 
next electoral cycle. With the next Duma elections due in 2011 and the presidential elections in 
2012, the Russian half of the partnership might find it difficult to concentrate their resources on 
the P4M when, as is usually the case, everything will be thrown into securing the outcome of 
elections.
43 
All things considered, there is a real risk that the EU-Russia P4M will produce nothing but 
empty words around the slogan of ‘modernisation’ with nothing to show on the ground. No 
matter how dire the need for reform in Russia. 
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